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Since the introduction of the Stabilization program in 1993, the Croatian National Bank has been following 
the monetary strategy of exchange rate anchor. During the first several years (from 1993 to 1997) this 
monetary strategy achieved acceptable results, accompanied with a low inflation rate and high GDP growth 
rates. However, the macroeconomic situation has changed in the last decade. The indicators of Croatian 
economy, such as trade balance, the level of external debt and GDP growth rates, are not satisfying. The 
criticizers of exchange rate anchor monetary strategy argue that appreciated kuna lowers the 
competitiveness of the domestic economy. Due to that, the current monetary strategy is in the focus of 
various economists' discussions.  
 
One of the alternatives to the exchange rate anchor is inflation targeting. There are different theoretical and 
practical issues connected to the implementation of this, very popular, monetary strategy. Before the 
implementation of inflation targeting, the following conditions need to be fulfilled: (1) the independence of 
monetary authorities in choosing the monetary instruments should be achieved, (2) at least one monetary 
policy instrument should be efficient, and (3) the transparency of monetary policy should be accomplished. 
The process itself consists of several decisions, such as choosing the proper measure of inflation, the level 
of targeted inflation, targeted range or point etc., which is still a matter of theoretical debates.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the above mentioned debate. After the theoretical discussion, 
the inflation targeting will be analyzed from the two perspectives. Firstly, in order to evaluate the capability 
of Croatia to implement the inflation targeting, the analysis of the Croatian monetary system will be given. 
Secondly, in order to asses the suitability of the inflation targeting as Croatian monetary strategy, both 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the introduction of the Stabilization program in 1993, the Croatian National Bank
1 has been 
following a monetary strategy of exchange rate anchor. During the first period from from1993 to 1997 this 
monetary strategy achieved acceptable results, accompanied with a low inflation rate and high GDP growth 
rates. However, the macroeconomic situation changed in the last decade. The indicators of Croatian 
economy, such as trade balance deficit, the level of external debt and GDP growth rates, have not been 
satisfactory. The criticizers of the exchange rate anchor monetary strategy argue that appreciated kuna 
lowers the competitiveness of the domestic economy. As a result, the current monetary strategy is in the 
focus of various economists' discussions. One of the alternatives to the exchange rate anchor is inflation 
targeting – nominal anchor introduced by monetary policy authorities at the end of 20
th century.  
 
2. ISSUES OF INFLATION TARGETING 
 
The first country which introduced the inflation targeting was New Zealand (1990), followed by a great 
number of other countries like Canada (1991), Great Britain (1992), Sweden and Finland (1993) etc. 
Although there is no clear consensus in the literature, the inflation targeting is often defined as a framework 
for monetary policy, characterized by the public announcement of official quantitative targets (or target 
ranges) for the inflation rate, over one or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgment that low, 
stable inflation is monetary policy primary long run goal (Bernanke, Mishkin, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999; 
Petursson, 2000). According to the mentioned definition, Mishkin (2001)  argues that inflation targeting 
encompasses five main elements:1) the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for 
inflation; 2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which 
other goals are subordinated; 3) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just 
monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; 4) 
increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and the 
markets about plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary authorities; and 5) increased accountability 
of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. 
 
2.1. Technical issues 
 
The first step in the implementation of inflation targeting is to define the measure of inflation which will be 
used. The optimal transparency of targeting is best achieved by choosing the index recognized by the 
public, which contains the prices of the key products in order to ensure its accountability. Beside that, the 
index should exclude the changes that are unlikely to affect the core inflation. In most countries the 
inflation target is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The main advantage of the CPI is that the 
index has a long history and is well known among the public. (Petursson, 2000). The fact that the CPI 
includes some items which are out of range of monetary policy and have temporary impact of inflation is 
the reason to use "modified" CPI as a target index (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Countries with formal inflation targeting 
  Adoption  year  Target band 
New Zealand  1990  0 – 2% (until 1996.) 0 – 3% 
Israel  1991  8 – 11% (until 1998.) 7 – 10% 
Canada  1991  1 – 3% 
England and Scotland  1992  1 - 4%, (until 1997.) 0 – 2,5% 
Australia  1993  2 – 3% 
Sweden 1993  1-  3% 
Czech Republic  1997  5,5 – 6,5% in 1998, 4 – 5% in 1999, 3,5 – 4,5% in 2000 
Switzerland  1999  0 – 2% 
Source: Petursson (2000), according to Bernanke, Mishkin (1997), Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin & Posen (1999), and central 
banks web-sites. 
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After defining the index, the second issue in the implementation of inflation targeting is the target variable. 
Due to a number of costs and benefits, a strong debate has taken place about whether to target the inflation 
rate or the level of prices. The choice between price level targeting and inflation targeting involves a kind 
of trade off between less low frequency price level variability and less high-frequency inflation and 
employment variability (Swensson, 1996). The inflation targeting entails more uncertainty in a long-term 
price forecasting than price level targeting does, which causes high variability in the price level.  At the 
same time, long-term price level targeting is accompanied by lower variability in the price level. On the 
contrary, price level targeting causes short-term fluctuations in inflation and output, which is not the case 
with inflation targeting. Another disadvantage of the price level targeting refers to the fact that higher 
inflation rate in a period t needs to be followed by a disinflation measures in a period t+1 in order to keep 
prices on the announced level. Parkin (1998) argues that nominal interest rates have a zero lower bound, 
and targeting a stable price level will conflict with the zero lower bound too often and leave monetary 
policy unable to speed the end of a recession. Beside that, he notes that inflation lubricates the labour 
market and makes it work more efficiently. Despite its opponents (See: Guender, Yooh On, 2005; Epstein, 
2005), the number of inflation targeters is growing up. 
 
The level of targeted inflation is the most important issue which has to be reconsidered by monetary 
authorities. There are two different approaches in the literature concerning this problem. According to 
Poole (1999), the most prominent advocate of zero inflation targeting, inflation uncertainty makes it 
difficult for individuals and firms to distinguish changes in relative prices among goods and services from 
movement in the aggregate price level. Beside that, maintaining a steady but positive inflation rate would 
probably be harder politically than maintaining a steady zero inflation. A third reason for targeting zero 
inflation concerns the distortions caused by the interaction of inflation with the tax code. Inflation indexing 
is incomplete, especially for investment income, because tax is levied on nominal interest and capital gains 
income. Arguments pros inflation targeting above zero rate are set up by Bosking et al. (1996). They found 
out that the HCPI index overestimates the real rate of inflation for one half to two percentage points, which 
brings to conclusion that targeting inflation at zero rate would actually bring to deflation, depending on 
observed economy. In addition to deflation problem, Mishkin (2001) emphasises the enormous costs of 
fighting deflation, which needs to be avoided. In accordance to the offered arguments most central banks 
target inflation values above zero rate level. The clearance from deflation is visible in the ECB strategy of 
inflation targeting at around level of two per cent: "While deflation implies similar costs to the economy as 
inflation, avoiding deflation is also important because, once it occurs, it may become entrenched as a result 
of the fact that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero. In a deflationary environment monetary policy 
may thus not be able to sufficiently stimulate aggregate demand by using its interest rate instrument. Any 
attempt to bring the nominal interest rate below zero would fail, as the public would prefer to hold cash 
rather than to lend or hold deposits at a negative rate. Although various monetary policy actions are 
possible even when nominal interest rates are at zero, the effectiveness of these alternative policies is not 
certain" (ECB, 2004: 51-54.)  
 
Another issue for policy makers is what to target, range or strict inflation point. Advocates of targeting the 
strict point argue that targeting the range (especially broader range) leads to uncertainty in inflation 
expectations which lowers the credibility of the central bank. On the contrary, targeting the range offers 
more flexibility in conducting the monetary policy. Thus, central banks usually target range rather than a 
point (See Table 1). Furthermore, problems on which the Bank of New Zealand has come across in early 
nineties (See: Bernanke et al., 1999; Brash, 2000) have made the controllability and credibility of narrow 
target bounds questionable. Narrow target bounds, just like targeting the point, lack flexibility. 
Consequently, most of inflation targeters deal with targeting broader range. 
 
Inflation targeting can be implemented trough one or more time horizons. Majority of central banks targets 
inflation within the one to four year range. The reason for avoiding short-term inflation targeting lies in the 
fact that the phenomena of inflation is not under the influence of monetary policy in the period shorter than 
one year. Theoretical background of this view can be found in the Friedman's "key assumptions of 
monetarism" (See: Perišin et al., 2001) Longer than four year inflation targeting horizon, on the contrary, 
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in the short term. The analysis of Batini and Nelson (2000) supports the view that, in practice, inflation 
targeting should be designed so that the target is achieved over the medium term. In other words, central 
banks wishing to act optimally should not attempt to neutralise inflationary shocks immediately, but 
respond gradually to them. 
 
2.2. Preconditions for implementation of inflation targeting 
 
The experience of long-time inflation targeters emphasizes preconditions which have to be fulfilled in order 
to implement successful inflation targeting. The first and probably the most important precondition for 
implementing the inflation targeting is the absolute instrument independence that must be given to central 
bank. Central bank needs to have the freedom to set its instruments of monetary policy, the way it believes 
that the objective will be achieved most adequately. Instrument independence mainly implies that the 
central bank is not constrained by the need of financing the government budget.  
 
The second precondition for implementation of inflation targeting is the existence of efficient monetary 
policy instruments. In the inflation targeting process central bankers need to have the instrument which is 
useful in stabilizing inflation movements. Present experience supports indirect monetary measures, first of 
all short-term interest rates, as the best solution for inflation targeters. (Blejer, Leone, 1999) 
 
The third but not less important precondition for inflation targeting is closely connected to the credibility 
and transparency of the central bank's functioning. Both, credibility and transparency are dominantly 
determined by the quality of central banks communication to the public.  It is very important for central 
bank to inform the public about every circumstance connected to its policy, in order to make its goals and 
instruments clear and controllable. A transparent monetary policy makes for a central bank more difficult to 
deviate from set targets, since such behaviour would have serious and long-lasting impact effects on its 
credibility (Petursson, 2000).  
 
2.3. Costs and benefits of inflation targeting strategy 
 
Inflation targeting can have both positive and negative effects on the economy. In accordance to their 
experience, inflation targeting advocates emphasise its positive characteristics:  
-  Inflation targeting, unlike the other explicit monetary anchors, is a monetary strategy according to 
which the activities of the central bank are oriented to domestic economy and potential shocks 
generated in it.  
-  The success of this strategy is not dependent on the stable ratio between money supply and inflation, 
since it is not based on this ratio.  
-  Number of variables that influence monetary policy making are unlimited, all information available at 
the moment have to be taken into consideration. 
-  Inflation targeting is positively accepted by the public, meaning that transparency and communication 
are generally on the satisfactory level. 
-  Quantitatively determined targeted variable (inflation rate), high level of transparency and regular 
communication increase central bank level of responsibility, acting as a precautious against possible 
problems of time consistency. 
-  Very positive experiences have been observed in countries which have been implementing the strategy 
of inflation targeting, reflecting in the lower inflation rate, as well as decreased level of inflationary 
expectations. An additional positive point is the fact that after initial decrease inflation rate stays 
remained on this lower level.   
 
On the other hand, there are some negative characteristics of inflation targeting. The opponents of this 
strategy find these characteristics sufficient to marginalize, if not merely to abandon the strategy. 
-  Numerous economists support the attitude that inflation targeting introduces significant rigidity into 
monetary policy making, restricting its potential for response in the circumstances of unpredicted 
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  Page 7 of 10
-  The influence of the monetary policy on targeted variable in conditions of inflation targeting can be 
observed with a certain time delay. Taking into account these delayed indicators it is not possible to 
estimate the effect of central bank measures promptly.  
-  The key argument against inflation targeting is stronger fluctuations in terms of income, which are, in 
many opinions, caused by this strategy. Namely, when the inflation rate is above its targeted level, 
central bank is implementing restrictive monetary policy measures, and vice versa. Changes in the 
monetary policy trend leads to fluctuations in the income level. 
-  Relating to the delayed effects of the central bank actions and its unpredictable results, inflation 
targeting at the end leads to a low responsibility of the central bank, which is especially dangerous in 
the developing countries. 
-  Inflation targeting can not prevent fiscal dominance. 
-  The flexibility of the foreign exchange rate, necessary for the inflation targeting implementation, under 
some circumstances can result in financial instability. (Mishkin, 2001; Kadioglu et al., 2000) 
 
3. INFLATION TARGETING IN CROATIA  
 
As it can been seen from the previous chapter, inflation targeting, like all other monetary strategies, has its 
positive and negative points. Implementation of inflation targeting in Croatia, like in other countries, 
requires fulfilment of the implementation preconditions, followed by the analysis of the costs and benefits it 
carries.  
 
Technical aspects of the inflation targeting (measure of inflation, target variable, time horizon), although 
theoretically questionable, are unified in the practice of inflation targeters. Most probably, these aspects 
would not be seen as a problem for Croatian monetary authorities. Special attention has to be given to the 
preconditions for the inflation targeting.   
 
1) The accomplishment of the first precondition, instrument independence of the CNB, is mainly ensured 
by the Croatian National Bank Act accepted in 2002. "Article 2, Paragraph (2): In performing its tasks, the 
Croatian National Bank shall be autonomous and independent and shall be accountable to the Croatian 
Parliament. Article 36, paragraph (1): The Croatian National Bank may not extend credit to the Republic of 
Croatia. Paragraph (2): No legal arrangement concluded by the Croatian National Bank with the Republic 
of Croatia shall have credit features or be used for extending credit to the Republic of Croatia or to third 
parties acting as intermediaries through which the Republic of Croatia would become the final beneficiary 
of such credit (CNB Act, 2002). Instrument independence of CNB existed in practice even before, which 
can be confirmed by the analysis of the CNB balance sheet.  After May 2000, CNB claims on government 
are equal to zero.  
 
2) The second precondition for establishing inflation targeting is the existence of efficient monetary policy 
instrument, useful in stabilizing inflation. The accomplishment of this precondition could not be observed 
as an easy task. Despite the fact of achieving its main goals, price and exchange rate stability, the CNB 
practice has been offering a bit different approach from the usual in the last fifteen years. Liquidity and 
banking crises at the end of the last century have forced the central bank to conduct a rather restrictive 
monetary policy. The privatization of the banking sector has additionally exposed the vulnerability of the 
monetary policy and its instruments. Finding no adequate resources at domestic money market, Croatian 
banks have had two possible options in order to improve their credit potential: a) turning to the European 
money market and b) taking loans from their mother- banks. Both approaches have brought to optimal 
results for the banking sector, mostly because of the huge interest rate spread between both the foreign and 
domestic money markets.  Consequently, the external debt of the Republic of Croatia expanded rapidly 
(Table 2). 
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Table 2: Gross external debt by domestic sectors (million euros) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003.  2004  2005  2006* 
1. Government  5.276  5.942 5.900 6.600 7.251 7.047  6.659
2. CNB  215  215 23 365 2 2  2
3. Banks  2.195  2.547 3.789 6.121 7.701 8.993  10.182
4. Other private sector  3.708  3.661 3.934 4.878 5.809 7.156  9.361
5. Direct investment  712  1.091,4 1.407 1.844 2.015 2.340  2.826
Total (1+2+3+4+5)                12.109 13.458 15.054 19.810 22.780 25.540 29.032
*Data not revised 
Source, Croatian national bank, May 2007;  available at http://www.hnb.hr/publikac/bilten/statisticki_pregled/h12.xls 
 
An additional problem arises from the slow but evident change in the bank credit policy - for the past five 
years Croatian banks have dominantly been oriented to crediting households sector. Thus, personal 
consumption became the dominant GDP component.  
 
The above mentioned process resulted in strong efforts of monetary authorities to stop new assignments 
and credit expansion. Since 2002 the CNB has introduced several monetary policy instruments: 1) reserve 
requirement, 2) marginal reserve requirement, 3) special reserve requirement, 4) compulsory CNB bills and 
5) minimum required amount of foreign currency claims, which are still in use. In spite of mentioned 
restrictions banks continued to borrow money on the European market. Furthermore, they connected 
Croatian private sector directly to their mother-banks. This way they succeeded to make extra profits by 
avoiding domestic regulations but brought Croatian monetary authorities to another dilemma: How to stop 
the private sector external debt growth? (Table 2). Unfortunately, but almost certainly, in the close future 
domestic public will witness the introduction of some new monetary policy instruments. Their efficiency 
will be a matter of some further discussion on this topic.  
 
On the other side, CNB discount rate has not been referent for years. Furthermore, with the lowest existing 
3,5% repo rate CNB offers inadequate amounts for banking sector. The analysis of the current monetary 
policy outlook brings to conclusion that CNB doesn’t react proactively to movements that happen in the 
monetary sector. Its reactions seem to be passive and not supported with necessary projections of future 
events. Therefore, relevant evidence exists that actual monetary policy and its instruments are not in line 
with the inflation targeting strategy.  
 
3) Credibility and transparency of central bank's functioning is the third precondition for inflation targeting. 
Transparency of CNB activities is confirmed by its adequate and ordinary communication to the public. 
Beside regular publications (SPF, Bulletin, Banks Bulletin, Annual Report, Macro prudential Analysis) 
CNB issues occasional publications (working papers, surveys, bilingual regulation booklets, other 
publications) too, which increases the level of its transparency.  
 
Concerning credibility, the situation is slightly different. Although, the most important elements for 
building central banks credibility
2 are fulfilled, the credibility problem is emphasised. The lack of trust by 
the public in the national currency and its exchange rate is reflected in the large proportion of foreign 
deposits. Bank's accounts evidence that the amount of foreign deposits exceeds the sum of demand deposits 
and savings and time deposits during the whole observed period (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Banks' Accounts, Liabilities – deposits (million kunas) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Demand deposits  11,386.0  15,180.6 21,166.2 23,315.0 23,591.3 26,653.3   33,911.7 
Savings and time deposits  7,651.1  10,213.1 13,001.1 18,370.7 22,479.2 27,992.1   44,836.8 
Foreign currency deposits  46,901.6  71,836.9 72,054.6 76,035.3 81,742.9 86,760.8   88,256.7 
Source, Croatian national bank, May 2007;  available at: http://www.hnb.hr/publikac/bilten/statisticki_pregled/d1.xls 
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Furthermore, the process of indexation of transactions to foreign currency (primarily the euro) is still 
evident. As a result, the national currency has merely the function of the means of payment and conducting 
transactions, but lacks the functions of measuring value, saving and crediting. This means that the monetary 
policy credibility in Croatia exists as far as the stability of prices is concerned but the same cannot be stated 
when addressing the central bank’s exchange rate policy (Ivanov et al., 2004). 
 
CNB instrument independence is achieved, but another two necessary preconditions for implementation of 
inflation targeting in Croatia are not completely fulfilled. It is evident that Croatian monetary system has 
passed through significant positive changes since 1991. The preconditions for adopting the inflation 
targeting regime in Croatia, however, are not present yet. Improving the monetary and inflation 
performance of transitional economies should probably continue to rely on simpler and less demanding but 
not necessarily less effective monetary policy frameworks (Masson et al., 1998). 
 
3.1. Costs and benefits of inflation targeting 
 
Due to the fact that inflation rate in the Republic of Croatia is low, among all above mentioned benefits of 
inflation targeting, one of them is specially interesting: under inflation targeting regime inflationary 
expectations are decreased. In spite of a long history of fighting inflation, the permanent effect of high 
inflation expectations is widely present in domestic economy. This thesis is best supported by price 
indexation of real estates and other valuables. In addition, the situation is worsened by the exchange rate 
clause introduced by commercial banks. Banks nominate most of their loans in euros in order to protect 
themselves of the exchange rate risk. Thus, decreasing inflation expectations under inflation targeting 
would bring significant benefits to the economy.  
 
Negative characteristics of inflation targeting which need to be analyzed are: 1) Stronger fluctuations in 
terms of income, which are, in many opinions, caused by this strategy and 2) the flexibility of the foreign 
exchange rate, necessary for the inflation targeting implementation, in some circumstances can result in 
financial instability.  
 
First of all, the current Croatian economic environment needs higher growth rates in order to lower 
unemployment and to make living standard better. Strong fluctuations of the income do not fit into this 
scenario at all.  
 
Secondly, negative characteristic refers to financial instability which can arise from the flexibility of the 
foreign exchange rate, necessary for the inflation targeting implementation. Under the assumption of 
successful implementation of the flexible exchange rate policy, monetary authorities will probably face 
another problem. Namely, high degree of (partial) dollarization (in the Croatian case it is about 
dollarization with the euro - euroization) may create a potentially serious problem for inflation targeting. 
Croatia, like many emerging market countries, suffers from substantially dollarized balance sheets of firms, 
households and banks. Accordingly, the majority of long-term debt is denominated in euros. Because 
inflation targeting necessarily requires nominal exchange rate flexibility, exchange rate fluctuations are 
unavoidable. However, large and abrupt depreciations may increase the burden of euro denominated debt, 
produce a massive deterioration of balance sheets, and increase the risk of a financial crisis. This suggests 
that emerging market countries cannot afford to ignore the exchange rate when conducting monetary policy 
under inflation targeting, but the role they ascribe to it should be clearly subordinated to the inflation 
objective. (Mishkin, 2001)  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Although the performance of the current monetary regime in the Republic of Croatia is not satisfactory, the 
change of nominal anchor and implementation of inflation targeting is not an option. In Croatia, like in 
most developing countries, the preconditions for adopting such a framework are not present yet. The 
instrument independence of the CNB is mainly ensured by the Croatian National Bank Act adopted in 
2002. However, the credibility problem and the problem of efficient monetary policy instruments are still FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-10 
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unsolved. The credibility problem is emphasized by the lack of trust in the national currency and its 
exchange rate. The analysis of the current monetary policy outlook brings to conclusion that CNB doesn’t 
react proactively to movements that happen in the monetary sector. Furthermore, an efficient monetary 
policy instrument is not detected. 
 
The cost benefit analysis offers no obvious evidence that the benefits from adopting a new nominal anchor 
would exceed its negative impacts. Furthermore, under the assumption of successful implementation of the 
flexible exchange rate policy, exchange rate fluctuations and possible depreciation pressures could increase 
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